We define a refinement of Nash equilibria called metastability. This refinement supposes that the given game might be embedded within any global game that leaves its local best-reply correspondence unaffected. A selected set of equilibria is metastable if it is robust against perturbations of every such global game; viz., every sufficiently small perturbation of the best-reply correspondence of each global game has an equilibrium that projects arbitrarily near the selected set. Metastability satisfies the standard decision-theoretic axioms obtained by Mertens' (1989) refinement (the strongest proposed refinement), and it satisfies the projection property in Mertens' small-worlds axiom: a metastable set of a global game projects to a metastable set of a local game. But the converse is slightly weaker than Mertens' decomposition property: a metastable set of a local game contains a metastable set that is the projection of a metastable set of a global game. This is inevitable given our demonstration that metastability is equivalent to a strong form of homotopic essentiality. Mertens' definition invokes homological essentiality whereas we derive homotopic essentiality from primitives (robustness for every embedding). We argue that this weak version of decomposition has a natural game-theoretic interpretation.
Introduction
This article contributes to the refinement of the Nash equilibria of a finite game. For a critical review of equilibrium refinements see Hillas and Kohlberg [9] . The initial sections of Hillas, Jansen, Potters, and Vermuelen [8] review further those refinements based on perturbations of a game's best-reply correspondence, which is the formulation adopted here.
We define a new refinement called metastability. Our definition builds on those proposed by Hillas [7] and variants studied by Hillas, Jansen, Potters, and Vermuelen [8] . However, metastability is a substantially stronger refinement because we invoke a natural generalization-the Embedding Principle described below-of the Invariance and Small Worlds axioms proposed by Kolhberg and Mertens [10] and Mertens [15] .
Our main results establish that metastability satisfies the standard decision-theoretic axioms considered by Mertens [13, 14] . It also satisfies the projection property and a slightly weaker version of the decomposition property-the two parts of Mertens' [15] Small Worlds axiom. Due to the latter, metastability is slightly weaker than the refinements proposed by Mertens, but in a companion paper [5] we prove that metastability coincides with Mertens' stability for generic extensive-form games. Mertens invokes homological essentiality as an integral part of the definitions of his refinements, whereas here we derive a strong form of homotopic essentiality from our definition. As described below, the definition imposes two basic requirements called Embedding and Robustness.
Briefly (a precise definition is provided later):
A connected set of the equilibria of a game G is metastable if every neighborhood contains the projection of an equilibrium for each sufficiently small perturbation of the best-reply correspondence of any global gameG in which G is embedded.
By an embedding we mean a trivial embedding in that the optimal strategies of players in G are not affected; that is, their best-reply correspondence is not affected. This definition invokes two principles.
1
(1) Embedding. Any game G can be construed as a local version of a global gamẽ G with additional features that do not affect optimal behavior in G. This principle subsumes those axioms requiring that a refinement is not affected by extraneous features:
• Small Worlds. The additional features could be actions of players inG who are not players in G, provided their actions have no effect on the optimal strategies of players in G.
• Invariance. The additional features could be redundant strategies of players in G, such as a pure strategy whose payoffs are replicated by some mixed strategy.
• Rationality. The additional features could be presentation effects, behavioral anomalies, or subjective beliefs that are not relevant for optimal play in G. Metastability ensures that a selected set of equilibria of a global gameG projects to a selected set of equilibria of any embedded game G. As Mertens [15, p. 555 ] remarks regarding the Small Worlds axiom: "... such a property is essential if one wants to speak of a 'solution concept.' Indeed, otherwise one could never apply the 'solution concept' to a given 1 The requirement that a metastable set is connected excludes the set of all equilibria, which trivially satisfies (1) and (2) . It also reflects the fact that all equilibria in a single connected component of the equilibria of a generic extensive-form game have the same outcome (Kreps and Wilson [11] ), and more fundamentally, the fact that the uniformly hyperstable sets of Nash equilibria are necessarily connected since they are precisely the essential sets of fixed points of any map whose fixed points are the Nash equilibria (Govindan and Wilson [4] ). Connectedness excludes the minimal stable sets studied by Kohlberg and Mertens [10] Mertens [15] argues that minimality violates the ordinal properties of players' preferences.
game; one would first have to embed this game in some 'universal game' of everything going on in the world." (2) Robustness. Nearby global games should induce nearby equilibria of the local game. Specifically, each neighborhood of a selected set should include the projection of an equilibrium of a sufficiently small perturbation of a global game in which G is embedded. That is, global perturbations induce small perturbations of optimal behavior in the local game.
We do not provide here a decision-theoretic justification for Robustness, but in [6] we establish that two properties (one of which is Invariance) imply robustness with respect to perturbations of strategies in the weaker refinement called stability by Kohlberg and Mertens' [10] . Although Robustness is a weak requirement, we show in §4 that in combination with Embedding it is equivalent to a succinct mathematical test. This test is a strong form of homotopic essentiality called stable essentiality. In technical terms, stable essentiality says that the strategy set of the given game remains in the range of every homotopic deformation of any suspension of the local projection map from the graph of equilibria to the space of strategy perturbations. Although stable essentiality is weaker than the homological essentiality invoked in Mertens' definition, it suffices to assure that the same decision-theoretic axioms are satisfied.
The fact that Embedding and Robustness imply stable essentiality has a precedent. In [4] Invariance and robustness with respect to payoff perturbations are shown to imply homological essentiality; viz., a uniformly hyperstable set (Kohlberg and Mertens [10] ) of equilibria is an essential component of every map whose fixed points are the Nash equilibria. In contrast, Mertens [13] directly imposes essentiality in his definition of a stable set.
As one knows from Mertens' work, essentiality of the projection map enables verification that decision-theoretic axioms are satisfied because it ensures that the fixed-point problems they pose have solutions. In §5 we establish the following properties:
• Admissibility, Perfection, and Backward Induction. A metastable set includes only perfect (hence admissible) equilibria, and includes a proper equilibrium that induces a sequential equilibrium in every extensive-form game with G as its strategic form.
• Iterative Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Never Weak Best Replies,
and Forward Induction. A subset of a metastable set survives iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies and strategies that are inferior replies at every equilibrium in the set.
Additional properties include the axioms of Ordinality and Player-Splitting.
Metastability differs from Mertens' stability chiefly in that it satisfies a version of the Small Worlds axiom that is weaker than the one proposed by Mertens. As stated above, it satisfies the first part of Mertens' axiom.
Projection Property. A metastable set of a global game projects to a metastable set of an embedded local game.
That is, if G is embedded inG andS is a metastable set forG then S ≡ proj G (S) is a metastable set for G. Mertens' stability satisfies the Projection Property and also its converse in the following strong form:
(1*) Each stable set of G is the projection of a stable set of each game in which G is embedded. (2*) If S is a stable set of G then for any stable set S of any other game G the product S × S is a stable set of the product game G × G .
The Projection Property along with (1*) is the Small Worlds Property. The Projection Property along with (2*) is the Decomposition Property. Metastability satisfies the following weaker versions of (1*) and (2*).
(1) Each metastable set of G contains the projection of a metastable set of each game in which G is embedded. (2) If S is a metastable set of G then for any other game G there exists a metastable set S of G such that S ×S is a metastable set of the product game G × G .
Thus (1) states that if S is a metastable set of G and G is embedded inG then there is a metastable setS ofG such that S ⊇ proj G (S), where the Projection Property assures that proj G (S) is itself a metastable set for G -and analogously in (2). Our view is that these weaker versions are natural from a game-theoretic viewpoint. A metastable set is intended to be a collection of possible outcomes that can be refined further only with additional information. For instance, in an extensive-form game the play off the equilibrium path is typically indeterminate, but in specific contexts additional considerations might lead to selection of (say) minimal or maximal 'punishments' for deviations from the equilibrium path. Analogously, embedding a game in a particular global game provides such a context that can select a metastable set (the projection of a metastable set of the global game) that is a strict subset of another metastable set. The decomposition property is thus seen as unduly strong when the product game G × G allows correlated selections of metastable sets for the two embedded games; i.e. correlated selections in the product game destroy some of the presumed independence between play in the component games.
Even so, these considerations are relevant only for non-generic extensive-form games, since metastability agrees with Mertens' stability for generic extensive-form games.
Our definition of metastability has two key aspects. One is that (as in Govindan and Mertens [3] ) we use the best-reply correspondence of a game as the primitive, rather than a formulation in terms of payoffs. The second is that (as in Hillas [7] and Hillas, Jansen, Potters, and Vermuelen [8] ) we test for Robustness using perturbations of the best-reply correspondence. The relevant mathematical tool is then homotopy theory rather than the stronger homology theory invoked by Mertens [13] for perturbations of strategies.
The key step of our technical development is the demonstration that metastability (like Mertens' stability) of a connected set of equilibria is a property of its germ, i.e. its neighborhood in the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over the space of strategy perturbations. Theorem 4.2 characterizes metastability in terms of the property that the local projection map from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is stably essential in the sense of homotopy theory. That is, as defined in Appendix A's Definition A.8, the map remains essential when it is embedded in a space with extra dimensions-using the formal definition of a 'suspension' from algebraic topology. (For the applications here, stably essential is the same as essential when the dimensions of the domain and range are the same, but not when the domain has higher dimension than the range.) This characterization is especially relevant for our companion paper [5] on extensive-form games, since nearby points in the germ (i.e., equilibria of nearby games) induce the beliefs that support sequential equilibria.
After the formulation and definition of metastability and related refinements are established in §2, technical aspects of the Robustness condition are established in §3. In particular, §3.4 shows that the Projection Property is equivalent to stable essentiality of the projection map from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence. Then in §4 metastability is also characterized in terms of the stable essentiality of the local projection map. Also in §4, the relationships of metastability to the stronger refinement of Mertens' stability and the weaker refinement of Hillas et al.'s BR-stability are established. Then in §5 we verify that metastability satisfies the decision-theoretic axioms listed by Mertens [13] . §6 provides concluding remarks.
Appendix A provides mathematical background regarding homotopic essentiality and defines stable essentiality of a map. Appendix B is a brief summary of the properties of multisimplicial and polyhedral complexes invoked in the proofs in §3.
Formulation and Definitions of Refinements
2.1. Preliminaries. Throughout, by a map we mean a continuous function. By a correspondence we mean an upper-semicontinuous correspondence whose domain is compact, whose range is a compact convex subset of a Euclidean space, and whose values are nonempty compact convex sets. For any two correspondences ϕ, ϕ :
We consider a fixed finite game G in strategic form. The player set is N = { 1, . . . , N }. Player n's mixed strategy set is Σ n and its vertices comprise his pure strategies Σ
• n . Let Σ = n Σ n . Player n's payoff function is given by a multilinear function G n : Σ → R. We use R : Σ → Σ to denote the best-reply correspondence of the game G.
For each δ ∈ [0, 1] let Σ δ be the set of σ ∈ Σ such that sn∈Σ • n \Rn(σ) σ n,s n δ for each player n, i.e. the total probability of player n's strategies that are suboptimal against σ is at most δ. Observe that all fixed points of a δ-perturbation of R are contained in Σ δ . Say that a closed subset V of Σ δ is admissible if V \∂Σ is connected and dense in V . Among the ways one might consider modifying the Robustness condition, one seems stronger and the other weaker. First, we could require that for each correspondence ψ
As Theorem 3.2 shows, this is equivalent to the Robustness condition as stated. Second, we could require that for each k there exists i(k) such that for each i i(k) and each correspondence ϕ
As we show at the end of §4 characterizing metastability, this too is equivalent to the condition as stated.
From the definition one might infer that verifying whether a set of equilibria is metastable is a formidable task. In §4 we show that a verification is accomplished by checking that the local projection map from the graph of the equilibrium correspondence to the space of perturbed is stably essential in the sense of homotopy. Basically, this requires that the projection map remains essential if it is embedded in a space with extra dimensions. The following is a version of Definition A.8 in Appendix A (cf. also Lemma A.6).
Definition 2.2 (stably essential map). Given a map p : (E, ∂E) → (P, ∂P ) where (P, ∂P ) is a ball pair with p(E\∂E) ⊆ P \∂P , and a
The map p is stably essential in homotopy if every trivial extension is essential in homotopy.
2.3. Related Refinements. To enable later comparisons we now state the definitions of the weaker refinement proposed by Hillas et al. [8] and the stronger refinement proposed by Mertens.
The following definition is due to Hillas et al. [8] .
Definition 2.3 (BR-set, BR-stable set). A closed subset S of Σ is a best-response set (BRset) if for every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that each δ-perturbation of R has a fixed point within ε of S. A BR-set is BR-stable if it is a connected set of perfect equilibria.
Hillas et al. [8] show that a BR-stable set satisfies several of the properties listed by Mertens [13] . BR-stability is a weaker refinement in that metastability invokes the Embedding Principle described in the Introduction. In effect, metastability requires BR-stability for any global game in which the given game might be embedded.
To present Mertens' definition we need some notation. For each player n and each 0 < δ 1, let P δ = { ετ | 0 ε δ, τ ∈ Σ } and denote its topological boundary by ∂P δ . For η ∈ P 1 ,η n ≡ s∈Σ • n η n,s is the minimum error probability.η n is constant across players so we denote this number byη. Given any η ∈ P 1 define the perturbed game G(η) to be the game where the strategy set of each player n is the same as in G, but where the payoff from a strategy profile τ is the payoff in G from the profile σ = (1 −η)τ + η. Then we say that σ is a perturbed equilibrium of G(η) if τ is an equilibrium of G(η). Let E be the graph of the perturbed equilibrium correspondence over P 1 , i.e.,
Observe that a pure strategy s of player n is in the support of τ n (η, σ) only if it is an optimal reply to σ in G. Denote by p the natural projection from E to
That is, as described in the Introduction, E δ is a germ.
LetȞ refer toČech cohomology with integer coefficients. As a mnemonic we refer to Mertens' definition of * -stability asȞ-stability.
(1) Connexity: For every neighborhood V of E 0 in E, the set V \∂E 1 has a connected component whose closure is a neighborhood of E 0 in E.
Mertens [13, 14] proposes several definitions of stability in which the essentiality requirement is cast in terms of singular homology with coefficients in an Abelian group M . He then shows thatȞ-stability is the union over M of all these refinement concepts and thus is the most inclusive solution concept.
Instead of working with the graph of the perturbed equilibrium correspondence we could equivalently work with the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, i.e. the set of (η, τ ) ∈ P 1 × Σ such that τ is an equilibrium of G(η) and thus σ = (1 −η)τ + ητ is a perturbed equilibrium of G(η). There is an obvious homeomorphism between the two spaces that commutes with the projections to P 1 . Hence we obtain the sameȞ-stable sets if we use the graph of equilibria. This observation is true for all 'stability' definitions involving subsets of E.
Mertens [14] does not explicitly define stability using essentiality in homotopy but the following definition is implicit.
Definition 2.5 (homotopy-stable set). S ⊆ Σ is a homotopy-stable (h-stable) set if for some closed subset E of E with E 0 = { 0 } × S:
In Definitions 2.4 and 2.5, if p is essential for some δ then it is essential for all smaller δ < δ. Mertens [14, Section 5] proves this for the case ofȞ-stability. Here we show that it is true for homotopy stability. Suppose the projection is inessential in homotopy for some 0 < δ < δ. We prove that the projection is then inessential in homotopy for δ. Let q : E δ → ∂P δ be a map that is homotopic to p : E δ → P δ relative to ∂E δ . The map q extends to a map over E δ when we let it coincide with p over E δ \E δ . Moreover p and q are now homotopic as maps from E δ relative to ∂E δ . Now define r : E δ → ∂P δ as follows: pick a point η 0 ∈ P δ \∂P δ ; then r(η, σ) is the unique point in ∂P δ that is nearer to q(η, σ) than η 0 on the line segment through η and η
0
. r agrees with q over ∂E δ , and there is a linear homotopy between q and r. Therefore, the projection from E δ is inessential.
Since essentiality in cohomology implies essentiality in homotopy,Ȟ-stable sets are also h-stable. If E δ is semialgebraic and has the same dimension as P δ then the converse is true.
(In [5] we show that this is precisely the case for generic extensive-form games.) However, the converse is not true in general since for pathological games E δ can have greater dimensional than P δ -see [14, Section 4] for details.
As mentioned, Appendix A, Definition A.8, defines the stronger property of stably essential in homotopy. A map is stably essential if it remains essential when its domain and range are extended trivially to higher dimensional spaces. Using this property, the following strengthens the definition of an h-stable set in Definition 2.5. Definition 2.6 (stably essential set). S ⊆ Σ is a stably essential set if for some closed subset
(1) Connexity: For every neighborhood V of E 0 in E, the set V \∂E 1 has a connected component whose closure is a neighborhood of E 0 in E. (2) Stable Essentiality: the projection map p : (E δ , ∂E δ ) → (P δ , ∂P δ ) is stably essential in homotopy for some δ > 0.
As before, one can show that if the k-th suspension (as defined in Appendix A) of the projection from (E δ , ∂E δ ) is essential then so is that from (E δ , ∂E δ ) for any smaller δ .
In §4 we prove that metastable sets are the limits of stably essential sets.
Suspensions of the Best-Reply Correspondence
The purpose of this Section is to obtain results about the Robustness condition in the definition of metastability. In §3.4 these are applied to obtain a characterization of the Small Worlds axiom in terms of a stably essential projection from the equilibrium graph. This section is mostly technical and so might be skipped on first reading.
Throughout this section, V is a closed subset of Σ. Consider the following two properties.
(1k) There exists 0
Asking for Property (2) to hold is obviously stronger than requiring Property (1k) to hold for each k, since it is uniform in k.
Remark 3.1. Suppose that property (1k) does not hold. Then for l > k, property (1l) does not hold. Indeed, fix δ > 0 and let suppose ϕ
We begin with some preliminary results about Property (1k). The analogous results for Property (2) should be obvious and we omit them.
Theorem 3.2. Property (1k) holds iff there exists
Proof. The sufficiency part is obvious. As for necessity, given such a correspondence ψ
is a well-behaved correspondence when W is nonempty. Extend it to a correspondence over
Proof. The necessity of the condition is obvious. As for sufficiency, consider a correspondence π Though we do not use the result, the following Theorem shows that the properties we are studying are related to suspensions of R.
identity function. Property (1k) holds iff there exists
Proof. The necessity follows from Theorem 3.2. As for sufficiency, suppose Property (1k) does not hold. Then, by Theorem 3.3, for each
3.1. Essentiality of Projections. In this subsection, we show the connection among Properties (1k) and (2) and the essentiality of suspensions of the projection map from E, the graph of the perturbed equilibrium correspondence. Throughout this section, let E = { η, σ) ∈ E | σ ∈ V }. p denotes the natural projection from E. In order to make the domain clear, we sometimes write p δ to denote the projection from (
Indeed, if a pure strategy s is not a best reply for player n against σ then η n,s = σ n,s = η n,s .
Proof. As in the remarks following Definition 2.5, one verifies straightforwardly that p k δ is essential for all δ < δ. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that essentiality of p Proof. The second statement follows trivially from the first. We prove the first statement. Our assumption along with Lemma 3.6 implies that q ) is the equilibrium of G(η) that corresponds to the perturbed equilibrium σ. Since ϕ k is convex valued, we now have that
and ψ is nonempty valued. Our assumption and Lemma A.2 imply that ψ has a point of coincidence with q
σ ∈ V by definition, and the proof is complete.
The following theorem gives a partial converse to the previous theorem. (2) holds, then p δ and q δ are stably essential for all 0 < δ δ. Moreover, if V is semialgebraic then it contains a stably essential set.
Proof. As before, the first statement in 3 follows from statements 1 and 2. We prove statement 1. (The proof for statement 2 is analogous.) By Lemma A.3 it is sufficient to show that every function f :
has a point of coincidence with the function p k δ . Accordingly, fix such a function f . Extend f to a function from is essential in homotopy. We now prove the second part of statement 3. Suppose now that V is semialgebraic. Then E is semialgebraic. Let S = { σ | (0, σ) ∈ E }. Obviously S ⊆ V . We now show that S contains a stably essential set. Since Property (2) holds, p δ is stably essential, as we have just seen. Let X be the closure of E\∂E 1 . Clearly, X is a compact semialgebraic set and { σ | (0, σ) ∈ X } ⊆ S. Moreover, by Remark A.7 the projection from X is also stably essential.
Let f : X → R be the function f (η, σ) =η. By definition, we have that for each δ 0, f If Property (1k) holds for each k then, by the previous theorem, p k δ k is essential for each k. As k grows large, if δ k goes to zero, then p δ is not stably essential. In other words Property (2) fails to obtain. We do not have an example exhibiting this phenomenon. Our next theorem gives sufficient conditions when this does not happen.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose V is a semialgebraic set. And suppose Property (1k) holds for each k. Then Property (2) holds.
The proof of this theorem uses the following lemma, which is stated in a slightly more general form here because it is used in the next section. Let X be a closed semialgebraic subset of E. For each 0 < δ 1, let (Y δ , ∂Y δ ) be the inverse image of (Q δ , ∂Q δ ) under the projection map from X to P 1 , and let q δ : (Y δ , ∂Y δ ) → (Q δ , ∂Q δ ) be the natural projection. For each k, q k δ and p k δ are defined exactly as we defined them for the sets F and E respectively. 
Proof of the Lemma. Since X is semialgebraic, for each maximal proper face 
is.
We now turn to the second statement. As we saw above, q
Using Lemma A.6, therefore, q
LetX be the quotient space of X δ 0 obtained by collapsing p 
Proof of Theorem 3.10. Since V is semialgebraic, E is semialgebraic and the above lemma applies. In particular, there exists δ 0 > 0 satisfying the conditions given there. By assumption, for each k, there exists δ k such that Property (1k) holds. Without loss of generality we can assume that δ k δ 0 . Using Theorem 3.8 and the above lemma, q k δ 0 is essential for each k. By Theorem 3.7, Property (2) holds.
Sufficiency of Essential Projections.
By the results of the previous subsection, checking whether Property (2) holds is equivalent to checking whether p k δ or q k δ is stably essential, which involves checking the essentiality of an infinity of maps. There is hence the question of whether there exists a k such that the essentiality of the k-th suspension of p δ implies that p δ is stably essential. We do not know the answer to this question in general. However, we know from Lemma A.9 that there are conditions when the essentiality of p δ implies its stable essentiality. This result, therefore, yields the following theorem, the proof of which is obvious. Such a function g produces a perturbation ϕ g of R defined as follows: ϕ g (σ) is the set of
Analogous to BR-sets, S is a CKM set if for every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for each g : Σ → P δ , ϕ g has a fixed point within ε of S. Hillas et al. [8] show that the CKM sets are exactly the BR-sets.
The results of the preceding subsection show that one obtains such an equivalence between the two notions. Observe that in the proof of Theorem 3.8, we need only a specific type of perturbation of R k , which are "suspensions" of CKM perturbations. Specifically, given a function g from Σ × Λ k to P δ (resp. Q δ ), we can generate a perturbation ϕ
, where τ is a best reply to σ. For p δ (resp. q δ ) to be stably essential, it sufficient that for each such g and f :
In conjunction with Theorem 3.7, we therefore have the following Theorem. 
3.4. The Small-Worlds Projection Property. We show here that Property (2) is equivalent to a projection property as in the Small Worlds axiom. We begin with a definition. Definition 3.14 (N -equivalent game). A finite gameG in strategic form is N -equivalent to G if: (i) the player set ofG includes N ; (ii) for each n ∈ N , his set of pure strategies is Σ • n ; and (iii) the payoffs of each n ∈ N depend only on the strategy choices of the players in N and coincide with his payoffs in G.
We refer to those players inG who do not belong to N as the 'outsiders.' We now construct an equivalent game and a δ-perturbation of its best-reply correspondence that leaves the best-reply correspondence of the outsiders unchanged and that does not have a fixed point projecting to a point in V . The proof of this last fact is quite involved and is therefore broken into three steps. It uses definitions and results in Appendix B about multisimplices (i.e., products of simplices) and polyhedral complexes.
Step 1-simplicial preliminaries. Let C be the closed set consisting of those points
. Therefore, we can choose a number α > 0 that is strictly smaller than f (σ, λ) − λ for all (σ, λ) ∈ C. Let K be the simplicial complex obtained by taking a sufficiently fine simplicial subdivision of Λ k so that each simplex of K is a convex polyhedron and has diameter at most α/2. By the multisimplicial approximation theorem (see Theorem B.3) there exists a barycentric subdivision L of K and, for each n, a barycentric subdivision T n of Σ n such that the map
α/2 since the diameter of each simplex of K is at most α/2; therefore g(σ, λ) − λ > α/2; i.e., λ and g * (σ, λ) belong to different simplices of K. Finally let Q be a polyhedral complex that is a refinement of T × L (viewed as a polyhedral complex) such that there exists a convex, piecewise-affine function γ : Σ×Λ k → R with the property that the maximal convex domains on which γ is affine are the full-dimensional polyhedra of Q-see Theorem B.4.
Step 2-constructing an equivalent gameG. We are now ready to define a gameG that is N -equivalent to G. The setÑ of players inG is N ∪ O, where the set O of outsiders comprises three players, denoted o 1 , o 2 , o 3 .
Step 2A-the strategy sets. 
, where σ o 1 ,s is the probability of pure strategy s in σ o 1 .
Step 2B-the payoff functions. To complete the description of the game we describe the payoff functions. For players in N their payoffs depend only on the strategy choices of the players in N and coincide with their payoffs in G.
Player Player o 3 's payoff function is given by
) and σ is the projection of σ * to Σ. The description ofG is now complete. By constructionG is N -equivalent to G. LetR be the best-reply correspondence of the gameG.
Step 3-analyzingR. The perturbation ofR we construct below leaves the coordinates of players not in N the same as inR. Therefore, we first analyze the structure ofR. Let σ * be a mixed strategy profile and let σ be the projection of σ * to Σ. Let λ = h(σ * o 1 ) γ(σ, λ) where the inequality is strict unless the polyhedron s contains (σ, λ). Thus, player o 3 's set of pure optimal replies is the class of polyhedra that contain (σ, λ).
Step 4-perturbingR. We now construct a δ-perturbationφ ofR that perturbs only the components ofR that pertain to the players in N , as follows. For each mixed strategy profile σ * in the gameG, the coordinates of the original players in N underφ are given byφ N (σ * ) = ϕ(σ, λ), where σ is the projection of σ * to Σ and
Step 5-fixed points ofφ. To finish the proof we show thatφ has no fixed point whose projection is contained in V . Letσ be a fixed point ofφ and let σ be the projection ofσ into Σ. Also, let λ = h(σ o 1 ). Sinceσ is a fixed point ofφ, σ ∈ ϕ(σ, λ). We show that if σ ∈ V then (σ, λ) / ∈ C, which completes the proof. 
(Recall from step 1 that for a point (σ, λ) ∈ C, λ and g(σ, λ) belong to different simplices.) Thus,φ has no fixed point projecting to a point in V .
Characterization of Metastability
We now obtain topological characterizations of metastable sets, and establish the relation of metastable sets to stably essential andȞ-stable sets. 
Proof. The sufficiency part of the proof is obvious. We turn now to the necessity of the conditions. Let δ i be a monotone sequence of positive numbers converging to zero and let V i be a corresponding sequence satisfying the conditions of Definition 2. 
, we have: Since P l is a neighborhood of S, it is a neighborhood of V i for large i. Therefore, by the connexity property for V i , and also by the above properties of X l , if i is also large enough such that δ i δ l then there exists 1 j i j l such that { δ i } × (V i \∂Σ), and hence also its
. Along a subsequence of i's now, j i is constant, say 1. Obtain by the diagonalization process, a subsequence of i's such that for each l and i l,
For each 0 < δ δ 1 define W δ to be the projection of X l,1 δ to Σ, where l is the unique integer such that δ l+1 < δ δ l . We show that the W δ 's satisfy the four enumerated conditions of the theorem. For the first three properties, we fix δ l+1 < δ δ l . 
Let Q δ = { η ∈ P δ |η = δ } and let ∂Q δ be its relative boundary. Define
By Theorem 3.7 it is sufficient to show that the natural projection 
is a connected subset of (g We now provide a characterization of metastability in terms of subsets of the graph E of the equilibria of perturbed games. For each 0 < δ 1, as in the above proof let Q δ = { η ∈ P δ |η = δ } and let ∂Q δ be its relative boundary. Let ( 
Proof. Given a metastable set S there exists a collection of W δ 's satisfying the conditions in Lemma 4.1. Define E to be the closure of ∪ 0<δ6δ 0 ψ δ (W δ \∂Σ)\∂F δ . E is obviously a closed subset of E. Moreover, it is nonempty: indeed, for each 0 < δ < δ , if σ ∈ W δ \∂Σ then σ ∈ W δ \∂Σ and ψ δ (σ)\∂F δ is nonempty. We prove that it satisfies the other conditions of the theorem.
We show first that E 0 = { 0 } × S. Observe that (0, σ) ∈ E 0 iff there exists a sequence of δ i 's converging to zero, and a corresponding sequence (η Fix 0 < δ δ 0 . By the robustness property for W δ and Theorem 3.8, the projection 
η / ∈ ∂Q δ , and (η, σ) ∈ ψ δ (σ). ThereforeF δ \∂F δ , and hence its closureF δ are contained in F δ . The stable essentiality ofq δ now implies that of q δ . Hence E satisfies the essentiality condition.
Again fix 0 < δ δ 0 . Since W δ \∂Σ is connected and ψ δ is a well-defined correspondence, ψ δ (W δ \∂Σ)\∂F δ is connected for all 0 < δ < δ. Also, for 0 < δ < δ, if (η , σ) ∈ ψ δ (W δ \∂Σ)\∂F δ then for all δ > δ > δ , σ ∈ W δ by Property (3) of Lemma 4.1, and there exists (η , σ) ∈ ψ δ (σ)\∂F δ . Therefore, for each λ
Since E is obtained by taking the closure of ∪ 0<δ <δ 0 ψ δ (W δ \∂Σ)\∂F δ , we have that E δ \∂E δ is connected; and its closure is a neighborhood of E 0 in E, since it contains, e.g., E δ/2 . The connexity condition now follows from the fact that the E δ 's form a basis of neighborhoods of { 0 } × S in E. This completes the proof of the necessity of the conditions. The sufficiency part follows from Theorems 4.3 and 4.4. do not have a counter example, the answer to this question appears to be no. In any event, the above three theorems readily imply the following compactness result for metastability. 
} is stably essential and hence metastable. By Theorem 4.5 S is metastable as well.
The results of this Section show that, as we asserted earlier, the collection of metastable sets remains the same if we weaken the Robustness condition in Definition 2.1 to the following: For each k there exists i(k) such that for each i i(k), and each correspondence ϕ
We will merely sketch the arguments here. Given a set S and a collection V i converging to S that satisfy this weak robustness property above and all the other properties in Definition 2.1, the proof of Lemma 4.1 can be modified to show that that there exists a nested collection of W δ that satisfy all the conditions of Lemma 4.1 except for the robustness condition, which now becomes: for each k, there exists δ k > 0 such that for 0 < δ δ k , and each correspondence ϕ
The proof of the necessity part of Theorem 4.2 can be used to prove the existence of a a set E, with E 0 = { 0 } × S, that satisfies the connexity condition there and the following essentiality condition: for each k, there exists δ(k) > 0 such that for 0 < δ δ k , the projection q
The proof of Theorem 4.3 does not require the stable essentiality of q δ : (E δ , ∂E δ ) → (Q δ , ∂Q δ ) for some δ, but rather the essentiality for each k of q k δ k for some δ k : indeed, this follows from the fact the sets E l constructed there are semialgebraic, coupled with Lemma 3.11. Thus, S can be approximated by a sequence of stably essential sets. Finally, Theorem 4.4 shows that S is indeed metastable in the sense of Definition 2.1. Thus, it is without loss of generality that we imposed the seemingly stronger Robustness condition for metastability.
Properties of Metastable Sets
Kohlberg and Mertens [10] and Mertens [13, 14, 15] list a basic set of game-theoretic properties that they argue any reasonable solution concept should satisfy. In this Section we show that, except for the decomposition property, metastability satisfies all their requirements. Metastability satisfies a slightly weaker version of the decomposition property.
5.1. Basic Properties. SinceȞ-stable sets exist and are metastable, we get existence for metastability. Also, by definition, metastable sets are connected sets of perfect equilibria. Metastable sets are BR-sets and the proof in Hillas [7] then shows that a metastable set contains a proper equilibrium and thus satisfies the backward induction property. Finally, by Theorem 4.5 the collection of metastable sets is compact in the Hausdorff topology.
5.2.
Forward Induction and Iterated Dominance. Kohlberg and Mertens [10] introduce the notion of forward induction by requiring that a solution to the game contain a solution to a game obtained by deleting a strategy that is not a best reply against any equilibrium in the solution of the original game. Mertens [13] strengthens this property by requiring the solution to survive even under deletion of a strategy that, while possibly optimal against some equilibrium in the solution, is nonetheless inferior in any ε-perfect equilibrium close to the set. Here we prove this property for metastability. If V i is a sequence as in Definition 2.1 then for large i, by our assumptions, s n is used with probability at most δ i at each σ ∈ V i \∂Σ. Hence it is used with zero probability in S. S can thus be viewed as a subset of the strategy space inḠ. And, formally, the theorem states this subset contains a metastable set inḠ.
Proof. Let V i be a sequence of subsets of Σ converging to S and satisfying the conditions of Definition 2.1. Assume that for each i, V i is a subset of V and δ i δ. By Lemma 4.1, we can further assume that V i is semialgebraic and contains S. LetΣ be the face of Σ where s n is used with zero probability. We can viewΣ as the strategy space of the gameḠ obtained by deleting strategy s n . Since V i contains S, which as we remarked above is contained in Σ,V i ≡ V i ∩Σ is a closed, nonempty, semialgebraic subset ofΣ andV i converges to S. By Statement (3) of Theorem 3.8 and Theorem 4.4, it is sufficient to prove thatV i satisfies the Robustness condition of Definition 2.1 in the gameḠ.
The setP δ i of δ i -perturbations for the gameḠ can be viewed as the face of P δ i where the error probability for s n is zero. Fix k and letf ×ḡ : converging to g (in the sup norm) such that for each l the image of the map is contained in
is completely mixed. By assumption, therefore, s n is used with probability η l n,s n under σ l n . By passing to a subsequence if necessary, the limit (σ, λ), which belongs to V i ×Λ k , is a fixed point of ϕ g × f where the probability of s n is zero, i.e. σ ∈V i .
The proof actually implies a slightly stronger forward induction property. If s n is not a best reply to any strategy in the sets V i \∂Σ then deleting the strategy preserves a metastable set of the smaller game.
5.3.
Ordinality and Player-Splitting. Kohlberg and Mertens [10] require that a solution is invariant under the addition or deletion of redundant strategies, i.e. a solution depends only on the reduced strategic form of the game obtained by deleting redundant strategies. Subsequently Mertens [15] provides a formal treatment of this notion, generalizing the idea to the concept of ordinality for solution concepts. Here we show that metastability is ordinal in the sense of Mertens. While Mertens considered the class of strategic-form games-where the strategy sets of the players are arbitrary polytopes and the payoff functions are multiaffinewe restrict ourselves here to games in normal form with finite pure strategy sets. Hence our treatment of ordinality is in the context of normal-form games (even though there is an obvious extension of metastability to this general class and ordinality obtains there as well).
Mertens [15, Theorem 2] gives two sufficient conditions for a solution to be ordinal. The following two theorems establish that metastability satisfies them.
A strategy τ n is an admissible best reply against a profile σ if there exists a sequence σ k converging to σ such that τ n is a best reply against σ k for all k. A profile τ is an admissible best reply against σ if for each n, τ n is an admissible best reply against σ. One then obtains an admissible best reply correspondence for the game that assigns to each σ the set of admissible best replies. Proof. Let S be a metastable set of G and let E be a germ for S satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.2. We can assume without loss of generality that E is the closure of E\∂E 1 ; indeed, the connexity condition obviously holds if we do so, while the essentiality condition holds because of Remark A.7. Given δ > 0 and a strategy profile τ ∈ Σ\∂Σ, observe that G(δτ ) andG(δτ ) have the same set of equilibria, since G andG have the same admissible best-reply correspondence. Therefore, E is also a subset of the graph of the perturbed equilibrium correspondence for the gameG. Hence, S is a metastable set of the gameG. The result follows from the symmetry between G andG.
We now state and prove a theorem that implies that metastability is invariant under addition of redundant strategies and also shows that the player-splitting property holds. Before discussing these properties, we present the theorem.
SupposeG and G are two strategic-form games with strategy spacesΣ and Σ respectively. Suppose f is a surjective linear mapping fromΣ to Σ such that for each 0 δ 1 andτ ∈Σ, σ is an equilibrium of the perturbed gameG(δτ ) iff f (σ) is an equilibrium of G(δf (τ )). The proof uses the following lemma. It is a version of the Generic Local Triviality Theorem for the case of polyhedra and linear mappings, and because of the formulation it yields a "global triviality" result. follows from the existence of the function h with the requisite properties, which we now prove. Let k be the dimension of Y . Since the graph of f is a compact convex polyhedron homeomorphic to X, it is sufficient to prove the lemma for the special case that f is a projection map onto, say, the first k coordinates.
We can further assume that X is a full-dimensional polyhedron in R k+d and Y is the projection of X onto its first k-coordinates. Indeed, suppose X is a polyhedron in R m with Y being the projection of X onto, say, the first k coordinates; then, since X is (k + d)-dimensional and its projection to the first k coordinates is k-dimensional, we can find d additional coordinates such that, after permuting the last m − k coordinates if necessary, the projection from X onto the first k + d coordinates is a homeomorphism between X and its image. Thus, replacing X with its projection onto its first k + d coordinates, we can assume that X is a full-dimensional polyhedron in R k+d and f is the projection of X onto the first k coordinates.
It is now sufficient to prove the theorem for the case where d = 1, since, in general, f can factored through a series of projections that omit one coordinate at a time. For each y ∈ Y , let y k+1 (y) (resp. y k+1 (y)) be the maximum (resp. minimum) over y k+1 ∈ R such that is a continuous correspondence and therefore by Theorem 4.5 it is sufficient to prove the result for a stably essential set. Also, by Theorem 4.3 we can further assume that the relevant sets have semialgebraic germs and satisfy the stronger connexity condition given there. For simplicity we call a set S with such a semialgebraic germ a semialgebraic stably essential set.
For this proof we view E andẼ as graphs of equilibria (rather than perturbed equilibria) of perturbed games for G andG respectively. SupposeS * is a semialgebraic stably essential set with a semialgebraic germẼ * . LetẼ be the set of (η,σ) such that there exists (η,σ ) ∈Ẽ * with f (σ) = f (σ ). ThenẼ is semialgebraic and f (f (S)) is a semialgebraic stably essential set as well. Therefore, to prove the theorem it is sufficient to show that S is a semialgebraic stably essential set of G iff f −1 (S) is a semialgebraic stably essential set inG.
S is a semialgebraic stably essential set in G iff there exists a semialgebraic subset S of E satisfying the essentiality condition of Definition 2.6 and the connexity condition of Theorem 4.3. For a semialgebraic subset E ⊂ E, letẼ = (δτ ,σ) ∈Ẽ be such that (δf (τ ), f (σ)) ∈ S. E is obviously semialgebraic and
E satisfies the connexity condition of Theorem 4.3 iffẼ does. Hence, it is sufficient to show that E satisfies the essentiality condition of Definition 2.6 iffẼ does too.
Because E andẼ are semialgebraic, by Lemma 3.11 it is sufficient to prove that E satisfies the essentiality condition of Theorem 4.2 iffẼ does. Fix 0 < δ < 1. We show that the projection q δ from F δ to Q δ is essential iffq δ fromF δ toQ δ is. Since Q δ andQ δ are homeomorphic to Σ andΣ, we view F δ andF δ as subsets of Σ × Σ andΣ ×Σ respectively. Thus F δ = (τ, σ) ∈ Σ × Σ is such that (δτ, σ) ∈ E δ andF δ is the set of (τ ,σ) such that (δτ ,σ) belongs toẼ δ (and therefore (f (τ ), f (σ)) belongs to F δ ). We viewq δ and q δ as the projection to the first factor.
Let ) is a homeomorphism. Therefore, using Lemma A.5, q k δ is stably essential iffq δ is stably essential. Observe now thatq δ =q δ • (Id × f ). Therefore, ifq δ is stably essential then so isq d and hence also q δ . On the other hand, suppose q δ is stably essential, and so too isq δ . Letting g be a continuous selection from f −1 , we have thatq δ =q δ • (Id × g) and henceq δ is stably essential. Thus we have shown that the essentiality condition for S is equivalent to that for S. Hence S is a semialgebraic stably essential set iff f
This proof shows that if g is a continuous selection from f −1 then S is a metastable set of G iff g(S) is. We are unable to ascertain the following stronger version of this property:S is metastable iff f (S) is.
The above theorem applies to invariance and player-splitting as follows. Formally, suppose we have two gamesG and G with the same player set. Suppose for each player n, there exists a surjective linear map f n :Σ n → Σ n such that if f :Σ →Σ is the corresponding map between the spaces of strategy profiles then for eachσ ∈ Σ the payoffs of the players inG are their payoffs in G from f (σ). Since f is surjective, we can actually view Σ n as a subspace ofΣ by choosing for each n and each pure strategy s n in G a pure strategys n in G such that f n (s n ) = s n . ThusG is obtained from G by adding redundant strategies. The above theorem now relates the solutions of G andG and yields the Invariance property for metastability.
The player-splitting property states the following. In an extensive-form game, if we can partition some player's collection of information sets in such a way that no play of the game intersects more than one element of the partition, then the solution of the game should be the same if we consider the agent-normal form where this player has as many agents as there are elements in the partition. We now formally state this property for metastability.
Suppose one has an N -player extensive-form game in which one can partition some player n's collection H n of information sets into two subcollections H n 1 and H n 2 such that no information set in one subcollection follows an information set in the other. LetG be the strategic form of the game. Consider now a new game G where we 'split' player n into two players n 1 and n 2 , i.e. the player set in G is (N \{ n }) ∪ { n 1 , n 2 }. The strategy sets of the players other than n inG are the same as in the two games. Each pure strategys n of player n inG prescribes actions at each information set in H n i for agent i = 1, 2 and thus gives a pure strategy for player n i in G n . Let S n i be player n i 's set of pure strategies in G and let Σ n i be the corresponding set of mixed strategies. We now describe the payoff functions for the players. Observe that a pair (s n 1 , s n 2 ) of pure strategies for the agents defines uniquely a pure strategy for player n inG. Therefore, given a profile of pure strategies in G, the payoffs of the players other than the two agents are the payoffs they get from the corresponding profile inG; for agent n i let it be n's payoff if the outcome induced by the profile follows an information set in H n i and let it be arbitrary otherwise.
For each i there is a well-defined affine function f n i fromΣ n to Σ n i that computes for each σ n the corresponding marginal distribution over
Then f satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.3 and we get the player-splitting property for metastability, in that it does not matter whether one treats the two agents as one player.
5.4.
The Small Worlds and Decomposition Properties. SupposeG is an N -equivalent game. As specified by Mertens [15] the Small Worlds axiom requires that solutions of G are precisely the projections of solutions ofG. Given Theorem 3.15, one might expect metastability to satisfy the Small Worlds axiom. As the following theorem shows, however, we obtain a slightly weaker version. Proof. LetS be a metastable set ofG. LetṼ i be a sequence of sets satisfying the conditions in Definition 2.1. For each i let V i be the projection ofṼ i to Σ. Clearly the V i 's converge to the projection, call it S, ofS. Also, the V i 's satisfy the connexity condition since theṼ i 's do. Finally, as for the Robustness condition, given a correspondence ϕ
and λ ∈ f (σ, λ). By the Robustness property forṼ i there exists a fixed point (σ, σ −N , λ) of
shows that V i satisfies the Robustness property and hence that S is metastable.
To prove the second statement, let S be a metastable set of G. Let V i be a sequence of sets converging to S and satisfying the conditions of Definition 2. 
is semialgebraic, by Theorem 3.8 it contains a stably essential setS i . By going to an appropriate subsequence, we have that S × Σ 0 contains a metastable set. By the first part of this theorem, its projection onto Σ is a metastable set of G, which is obviously contained in S.
As shown in [15] the collection of q-stable sets (defined in [14] ) satisfy the stronger form of the Small Worlds property, namely that they are precisely the projections of q-stable sets of N -equivalent games. Since q-stable sets are metastable as well, it would be interesting to know if the collection of metastable sets that satisfy the stronger property for metastability is exactly the collection of q-stable sets.
A property related to the Small Worlds axiom is the Decomposition Property, which states the following. Suppose G is connected and dense in E δ and the projection from E 1 δ is stably essential.
. E is a closed semialgebraic set. For each 0 < δ δ 0 , we claim that p : (E δ , ∂E δ ) → (P δ , ∂P δ ) is stably essential. To see this, for each 0 < δ < δ 1 , let V δ be the projection of E δ onto Σ . Then, by Theorem 3.7, V δ satisfies the robustness condition in the definition of metastability. In particular, for each 0 < δ δ 1 , and for each k,
Let X be the closure of the set of E\∂E 1 . Then X is a semialgebraic set as well and by Lemma A.7 the projection from X δ is stably essential for each 0 < δ δ 0 . By [ 
Without loss of generality we can assume that δ 0 δ 1 . The stable essentiality of the projection from X δ along with properties (ii) and (iii) imply that there exists k such that the projection from X . There exists σ 
Concluding Remarks
The refinements defined in §2 differ chiefly in the formulation of the corresponding version of robustness. As Hillas et al. [8] show, homotopy stability is more restrictive than BRstability because homotopic essentiality invokes a richer class of perturbations. Stable essentiality is an even stronger requirement because it invokes the Embedding principle, including the axioms of Invariance and the projection property of Small Worlds. (Co)homological essentiality is evidently the strongest criterion-and importantly, unlike homotopy criteria it ensures that essential maps are surjective. It is this difference that accounts for the slightly weaker form (compared to Mertens' refinement) of the Small Worlds property established in Theorem 5.5, and the possible failure of metastability to satisfy (D2) of the Decomposition property. However, we show in [5] that this difference occurs only for a game whose extensive-form has nongeneric payoffs.
For the foundations of game theory, the development of a canonical refinement of Nash equilibria requires one to choose among these topological criteria. This choice must ultimately be guided by decision-theoretic criteria. The results in this paper imply that the weakest topological criterion that preserves the standard list of decision-theoretic axioms is stable essentiality. Our exposition is cast differently in that we begin straightaway with the definition of metastability and its motivation in terms of the principles of Embedding and Robustness, and then establish that this definition is equivalent to stable essentiality of the projection map from the equilibrium graph. But this is the crux of the matter technically.
Our view is that metastability is a viable substitute for Mertens' refinements based on (co)homological essentiality of the projection map, since metastability yields basically the same decision-theoretic properties. From a computational viewpoint, the test for metastability (stable essentiality) is more difficult to apply. It advantage in applications may therefore lie in its conceptual justification and its agreement with Mertens' stability in generic extensive-form games.
Appendix A. Mathematical Background
We first study some properties of a map whose range is homeomorphic to a ball. Throughout, let (X, ∂X) be a compact pair and let (B, ∂B) be homeomorphic to a ball with its boundary. (We are not assuming here that ∂X is the boundary of X.) A map f : (X, ∂X) → (B, ∂B) is essential in homotopy if it is not homotopic relative to ∂X to a map to ∂B. Mertens [14, Section 4E, Lemma 2] proves the following equivalent characterizations of inessentiality.
Lemma A.1. The following statements are equivalent.
• f : (X, ∂X) → (B, ∂B) is inessential in homotopy.
• There exists a map g : X → ∂B that agrees with f on ∂X.
• There exists a map g : X → ∂B such that the restrictions of f and g to ∂X are freely homotopic.
The following Lemma shows that a map that is essential in homotopy has strong fixedpoint properties. Proof. Suppose there exists g : X → B that has no point of coincidence with f . Viewing B as a ball, define a map h : X → ∂B as follows: for each x ∈ X, h(x) is the unique point in ∂B that is closer to f (x) than g(x) on the line from g(x) through f (x). Clearly h coincides with f on ∂X and hence f is inessential. Assume now the additional hypotheses of the second statement. Using McLennan [12, Proposition 2.25], for each ε > 0 there exists a function g ε : X → Y whose graph is within ε of the graph of ϕ. By what we have proved, each g ε has a point x ε such that f (x ε ) = g ε (x ε ). Let x be the limit of a convergent sequence of x ε as ε goes to zero. Then x is a point of coincidence between f and ϕ.
As the following Lemma shows, the above coincidence property completely characterizes the essentiality of f in some cases. Proof. There is no loss of generality in assuming that B is the unit ball in a Euclidean space. Suppose f is inessential. Then there exists a map g : X → ∂B that agrees with f on ∂X. We could equivalently define a multisimplicial approximation by requiring that for each σ, and each simplex L of L, g(σ) ∈ L =⇒ f (σ) ∈ L. The following theorem is the multisimplicial version of the simplicial approximation theorem. 
B.2. Polyhedral Complexes.
A polyhedral complex P is a finite collection of polyhedra such that: (i) each face of a polyhedron in P belongs to P; and (ii) the intersection of two polyhedra in P is either empty or a face of each of them. The union of the polyhedra in P is the space of the polyhedral complex and denoted |P|. Every multisimplicial complex, for example, is a polyhedral complex where the polyhedra are the multisimplices.
A polyhedral complex P is a polyhedral subdivision of P if each polyhedron in P is contained in a polyhedron of P and each polyhedron in P is the union of polyhedra in P . The following Lemma is the basis for defining Player 0's payoff function in Step 2 of the proof of Claim equivalent game. Proof. The polyhedral complex P is derived from P as follows (Eaves and Lemke, 1981) . Let P 1 be the set of all (d − 1)-dimensional polyhedra in P. For each polyhedron P ∈ P 1 , let H P = { z ∈ R n | a P z = b P } be the hyperplane that includes P , and if d < n is orthogonal to |P|. Let P 0 be the set of all polyhedra of the form |P| ∩ [∩ P ∈P 1 H i P ] where each i ∈ { +, − } and H + P and H − P are the two closed half spaces whose intersection is H P . P 0 is a collection of d-dimensional polyhedra whose union is |P|. Let P be the polyhedral complex consisting of all the polyhedra that are faces of some polyhedron in P 0 . By construction, P is a polyhedral subdivision of P. Associate with P the map γ : |P| → R + for which γ(σ) = P ∈P 1 |a P σ − b P |. Then γ is convex and piecewise affine. Moreover, the maximal convex domains on which γ is affine are the polyhedra in P 0 , which are the d-dimensional polyhedra of P .
